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As John Crook has pointed out, most of the armed conflicts of
recent years have been internal rather than international, and most of the
suffering of the civilian population has occurred in these internal conflicts.
The United States and other western governments have been trying for a
number of years to improve both the legal standards applicable in internal
conflicts and the means for their enforcement. This morning, I would like
to survey the various contexts in which this question has arisen and to
describe what the United States has attempted to do in each case.
John has already referred to the basic texts that apply rules of
international humanitarian law to internal conflicts-namely, common
article 3 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Additional Protocol
II to those Conventions. During the Geneva Diplomatic Conference which
adopted the Additional Protocols, the western group fought a hard and
largely unsuccessful battle to bring the substance of provisions applicable
in internal conflicts closer to those applicable in international conflicts,
particularly with respect to protection of the civilian population.
There were two primary obstacles. First, the nonaligned and
Soviet blocs expressed the concern that any strengthening of the
obligations applicable in internal conflicts would give enhanced political
and legal status to insurgent groups, and would lead to greater
international intrusion into their internal affairs. This was a particular
concern of the many nonaligned states that did not have a strong history of
national unity, and that lived in fear of secessionist ethnic, tribal and
religious movements within their societies. It was also a concern of
governments that had been the object of international criticism for
domestic abuses, and that were not inclined to give new grounds and new
opportunities for such criticism or intervention.
Second, there were concerns that the standards and procedures of
international humanitarian law, which had been developed to regulate the
conduct of states and regular armed forces, could not sensibly be applied
to internal conflicts where the insurgent groups often had little internal
discipline and fewer incentives to comply with international standards they
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had no hand in negotiating and may never have accepted. A frequent
objection was that these governments could not be expected to require their
military forces to obey restrictions which their insurgent opponents had not
accepted and might not have the ability to comply with if they wanted to
do so.
As a result, Additional Protocol II is not as comprehensive as
western delegations had wanted, either with respect to its substance or its
scope of application. With respect to substance, the Protocol was an
important improvement in some areas, but its protections for the civilian
population, for detained persons and for those engaged in humanitarian
work were in many ways only a pale copy of the rules for international
armed conflict.
With respect to its scope of application, the Protocol excludes
conflicts with insurgent armed groups which are not under responsible
command or which do not exercise such control over a sufficient part of
national territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted
military operations. Unfortunately, these provisions would exclude many
guerrilla wars fought by irregulars. They have also provided a convenient
basis for governments that do not wish to apply the Protocol to decline to
do so.
The view of the United States is that the rules of Additional
Protocol II should apply to all internal armed conflicts, and in submitting
the Protocol to the Senate the Executive Branch proposed that United
States ratification be subject to a formal Declaration that it would so apply
the Protocol and would encourage all other states to do likewise. We hope
that the Senate can be persuaded to give its advice and consent to the
Protocol with this Declaration at an early date.
Since 1977, the United States has attempted in various contexts to
expand the application of international humanitarian protections to internal
conflicts. For example, during the drafting of the Statute of the
International War Crimes Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, we took the
position that the Tribunal should have jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes
against humanity and genocide in internal as well as international armed
conflicts.
The Statute that was drafted by the United Nations Secretariat and
adopted without change by the Security Council in 1993 included four
jurisdictional articles. The article on crimes against humanity expressly
stated that the Tribunal had jurisdiction over such crimes when committed
in armed conflict, whether international or internal in character .... The
articles on grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, other
violations of the law and customs of war, and genocide did not expressly
state whether they applied in internal conflicts. In her explanation of vote
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in the Security Council in favor of the Statute, Ambassador Albright stated
for the record that the United States interpreted the jurisdiction of the
Tribunal to apply in all respects to internal as well as international
conflicts, including violations of the provisions on internal armed conflicts
in common article 3 of the 1949 Conventions and Additional Protocol II.
When these issues came before the Appeals Chamber of the War
Crimes Tribunal in the course of ruling on various appeals by the first war
crimes defendant (Dusko Tadic), we argued that the conflict in the former
Yugoslavia was in fact an international conflict, but that in any event each
of the jurisdictional provisions of the Tribunal's Statute applied in both
international and internal conflicts. The Appeals Chamber disagreed with
our argument that the entire conflict was international in character, and
disagreed with our argument that the grave breaches provisions of the
1949 Geneva Conventions applied in both types of conflicts. However,
the Chamber agreed that the other jurisdictional provisions applied in
internal as well as international conflicts, relying heavily on the United
States statement during the deliberations of the Security Council.
Therefore, although we did not agree with the reasoning of the Appeals
Chamber on all points, it did sustain our basic argument that the Tribunal's
jurisdiction did apply to violations of genocide, war crimes, and crimes
against humanity committed during internal armed conflict.
When the International War Crimes Tribunal for Rwanda was
created by the Security Council in 1994, it was agreed by all concerned
that the Rwanda situation was an internal armed conflict, and this time the
jurisdictional provisions of the Rwanda Statute were drafted so as
expressly to apply to the rules of humanitarian law in internal armed
conflict, as well as to genocide and crimes against humanity. Therefore,
there should be no question that the applicable rules of common article 3
and Additional Protocol II will apply in the Rwanda war crimes trials.
The question of internal armed conflict was also a critical issue
during the negotiations of the past few years to improve the international
rules governing the use of conventional weapons-particularly land mines
and similar devices, which are governed by the Mines Protocol of the 1980
Convention on Conventional Weapons. Unfortunately, the 1980
Convention clearly applied only to international conflicts, while the great
majority of civilian casualties from land mine use in recent conflicts have
occurred in internal conflicts, such as those in Angola and Cambodia. It
was therefore one of the primary United States objectives in the revision of
the Mines Protocol to expand its scope to include all internal conflicts. At
first, the nonaligned states opposed such an expansion, for all the same
reasons that had caused them to oppose the expansion of the scope and
content of Additional Protocol II.
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In the end, we and other western delegations were able to convince
these states that a revised Mines Protocol would be of little practical value
if it did not apply to internal conflicts, and that there was no valid reason
for denying the civilian population protection from land mines simply
because the conflict in which they found themselves happened to be
internal rather than international. To meet their concerns about the legal
effects of expanding the scope of the Protocol, we added language
specifically disclaiming any effect on the legal status of the conflict or the
insurgent groups involved, as well as a provision stating that the
obligations of the Protocol would apply equally to all parties to the
conflict. These additions seemed to provide the necessary cover to allow
them to agree to the expansion of scope.
However, I do not know whether this expansion of the Mines
Protocol to internal conflicts suggests that it may now be possible to
expand other humanitarian law protections to internal conflicts. In
agreeing to the expansion of the scope of the Mines Protocol, one key
nonaligned state made clear that it viewed this as an exceptional
circumstance that should not be repeated elsewhere, and blocked the
proposed expansion of the scope of other parts of the Convention,
particularly the new Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons that was adopted
at the same time. Furthermore, we were not able to persuade the
nonaligned to accept a western proposal for international fact-finding
investigations into alleged violations of the Mines Protocol, and one of the
reasons often cited for the nonaligned refusal was that it would never be
acceptable to have international investigations into the circumstances of
internal conflicts.
In surveying the field on the application of law to the conduct of
internal armed conflicts, we should not neglect various provisions of arms
control agreements that affect the use of weapons in those conflicts. The
best early example of this was the 1925 Geneva Protocol which prohibited
the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons. This Protocol is often
classified as an arms control agreement, but in fact it states a very
important rule of the law of armed conflict. By its terms, the Protocol
only applies to the use of these weapons in war, which was understood to
mean international armed conflict. Over the years, however, more and
more states came to accept the position that this prohibition had become a
part of customary international law applicable in internal as well as
international conflicts. This position was supported by the United States in
the aftermath of the use of chemical weapons by Iraqi forces against
Kurdish civilians in northern Iraq after the end of the Iran-Iraq War.
Not all states accept this view of customary law. However, two
arms control agreements concluded in recent decades would produce much
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the same effect. The 1972 Biological Weapons Convention did not
expressly deal with the use of such weapons in armed conflict, but did
prohibit any acquisition or retention of biological agents of types or in
quantities that have no justification for peaceful purposes, or of weapons
or means of delivery designed to use such agents for hostile purposes or in
armed conflict. The effect of these prohibitions is to make it impossible
lawfully to use biological weapons in any form of armed conflict.
Likewise, the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention expressly prohibits the
use of chemical weapons, and the use of riot control agents as a method of
warfare. This would clearly preclude the lawful use of chemical weapons
in either internal or international conflicts.
The United States was a strong supporter of both these
conventions, and is of course a party to the Biological Weapons
Convention. The Chemical Weapons Convention has been submitted to
the Senate, but the Senate has not yet given its consent to ratification. We
hope this will occur soon.
Finally, attempts have been made recently by government and non-
government experts to identify the rules which may be said to be part of
customary international law in international and internal conflicts, or to
define sets of principles that should be applied in all circumstances-
whether in armed conflict or peacetime. I imagine that Professor Meron,
who has been active in these efforts, will describe them in greater detail.
The United States is particularly interested in the current project of the
International Committee of the Red Cross to conduct a detailed study of
the customary rules of international humanitarian law, and hopes to
contribute in a concrete way to this useful work.
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